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Abstract
Unlike novices, expert clinicians develop refined schemes and strategies that
predictably allow them to provide a better quality, prompt and less error-prone
patient care input. Empowering novices with cognitive aids or mental schemes as
early as possible in their clinical career may significantly improve their critical
thinking, problem-solving and decision-making skills. These cognitive aids may also
improve trainees’ use of evidence-based medicine in addition to reducing their
diagnostic errors and improving their therapeutic care inputs.
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Introduction
Optimal problem-solving, clinical reasoning and rational decision-making are
indispensable skills for quality care provision. These coupled with a comprehensive
knowledge base are the two components of an ‘expert medical practitioner’.
Cognitive conceptual deficiencies in decision-making have been shown to be an
important cause of diagnostic errors, deficient therapeutic interventions and poor
outcomes in both acute and ambulatory care settings [1–5]. Unlike novices, clinical
experts tend to utilize ‘mental schemes’ for problem-solving, clinical reasoning and
rational decision-making [6]. Research has confirmed that equipping trainees with
the experts distinguishing, scheme-driven strategies significantly improves their
decision-making skills, specifically in the diagnosis domain [7]. In essence, these
schemes are knowledge and experience-based, cognitive aids that facilitate
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knowledge retrieval from the expert’s memory, thereby enhancing the practical
instigation of a logical and organized problem-solving approach. It is anticipated that
scheme-based cognitive training of novices and juniors will enhance their diagnostic
problem-solving and decision-making abilities at an earlier stage in their career [6].
Generic cognitive aids or schemes presented in easy to recall, structured concept
maps may thus serve as simple reminders to front-line staff, especially novices, on
how to approach diagnostic and therapeutic uncertainties peculiar to their patients. It
is generally believed that clinicians utilize two modes of reasoning for decision-
making, namely System 1 and System 2 [8–10]. System 1 is a non-analytic, fast and
intuitive one usually based on previous exposure whilst System 2 is an analytic, slow
and rational mode acquired through structured training. Both are generally used
interchangeably, yet System 1 is more error-prone. Cognitive aids used as ‘cognitive
forcing strategies’ [11] should in principle facilitate and promote the use of System 2
in critical thinking and decision-making.
In this monograph, an approach for diagnostic and therapeutic decision-making
using cognitive aids or schemes is presented. Cognitive aids, schemes and concept
maps are used interchangeably. Hypothetical case scenarios are portrayed to assist in
a better understanding of the concepts depicted in the monograph. Table 1 portrays
the various steps or actions map in a patient encounter and its recommended
cognitive schemes.
Step 1: building knowledge and summarizing the problem
The first step in any clinical encounter is ‘information gathering’. This is achieved
through history taking and physical examination. A skilled yet brief visual and
auditory assessment of the patient allows the relatively experienced clinician to
Table 1 Actions map for a patient encounter and their cognitive schemes
Step Clinical action Scheme/cognitive aid
1 Gather information (history and
physical)
–
2 Propose a diagnosis Pattern-recognition hypothetico-deductive strategies and smart
heuristics, rule-out worst scenario, red flags, etc.
3 Differential diagnosis Differential diagnosis cognitive aids: anatomical, physiological,
pathological
4 Order tests (rationally) Frugal heuristics probability assessment: test sensitivity,
specificity and likelihood ratios
5 Confirm and comprehensively
give a diagnostic label
Guideline-friendly bedside diagnosis, aetiology, severity
(BESD)
6 Therapeutic interventions Contextual, patient-centred therapeutic cognitive aid: site of
care, symptomatic, supportive, specific and speciality referral
(5S)
7 Prepare for discharge Assess response to treatment (subjective and objective), criteria
for discharge, timing of follow-up (ACT)
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decide on the severity and seriousness of the presenting symptom. Once a complete
and focused history and physical examination are completed, a vital step and an
essential prerequisite before proceeding any further is to skilfully articulate a short
summary of the clinical history and examination findings emphasizing only the
positive and relevant features. The latter should additionally be phrased in conclusive
technical medical terms, e.g. symptoms of lateral chest pain with coughing are
qualified as pleuritic, red urine as haematuria, non-swollen, painful joints as
arthralgia, stony dullness on examination as pleural effusion, enlarged spleen as
splenomegaly, a single, swollen, painful joint as mono-arthritis, etc. Mastering this
skill differentiates the novice from the expert and is generally conducive to better
decision-making [12]. A structured, summary template for generic use is shown in
Box 1.
Step 2: making the diagnosis
The next step is making a bedside clinical diagnosis or a short list of a few
differential diagnoses. This is probably the most crucial step in a patient encounter
and the most error-prone [1, 2, 4]. Cognitive as well system errors contribute to
patient harm and poorer outcomes [1, 2, 4]. As such, cognitive, individual or
caregiver aids and strategies (as well as system interventions, see below) to enhance
the trainees’ diagnostic accuracy and therapeutic interventions are indispensable
[13, 14].
A four-phased scheme is depicted:
Reaching a bedside clinical diagnosis using pattern recognition
and hypothetico-deductive strategies [15]
Pattern recognition is the simplest and non-analytic ‘spot diagnosis’ of a clinical
presentation usually based on classic visual clues or specific test finding. For
example, the rash of herpes zoster, the facies of a patient with acromegaly and the
electrocardiogram findings of an acute myocardial infarction. Another pattern-
recognition strategy is achieved through heuristics [16, 17]. Heuristics are mostly
history-based, expert-employed, pattern-recognizing ‘rules of thumb’ or short-cut
decision strategies that rely on a small fraction of the gathered information (relevant
or trustworthy predictors) for considering a diagnosis. For example, a middle-aged
smoker with central chest pain radiating to his left upper limb will automatically be
labelled as having an acute coronary syndrome. Similarly, a postoperative patient
with a single swollen leg, shortness of breath and haemoptysis will be labelled as
Box 1 Summarizing the history and physical examination
Comprehensive but concise, text-book-like:
Must contain patient’s name, gender, age, ±occupation, ±nationality, ±racial/geographic origin,
relevant past history/social history/family history, drug/allergic history, symptoms ?duration—in
technical terms, relevant physical signs in technical conclusive terms
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suffering from pulmonary thromboembolism and a 12-year-old with a right-iliac
fossa pain that started para-umbilically and is associated with anorexia and vomiting
will be given the diagnosis of acute appendicitis. Although both visual and history-
based pattern recognition strategies are fast decision/diagnostic strategies, heuristic,
pattern recognition is of lower fidelity and reliability than visual, pattern recognition
spot diagnosis and is thus more error-prone [16, 17].
However, many clinical encounters and diagnostic challenges are primarily
unravelled using another strategy: the hypothetico-deductive strategy [15].
Clinicians utilize clinical and epidemiological clues from the information gathered
by history-taking and possibly substantiated by physical examination to arrive at a
single diagnosis or a short-list of differential diagnosis. As mentioned above, this is a
critical and error-prone stage for novices [1, 4]. Skilled experts revert to at least two
other strategies to solve the diagnostic puzzle whilst excluding immediate life-
threatening or ‘not-to-miss’ diagnoses: ‘red flags’ and ‘rule out the worst scenario’
(ROWS) [18].
ROWS and red flags are strategies that assist the clinician to avoid missing the
most serious of the possible differential diagnoses. For example, the expert will
automatically enquire, examine and investigate for the more serious causes of central
chest pain such as acute coronary syndrome and aortic dissection rather than for the
other less serious causes such as oesophageal spasm. Similarly, meningitis and
intracranial vascular events will be the primary concerns for the expert interviewing a
patient with headache. Red flags for the latter scenario (acute meningitis) may
include symptoms such as fever and photophobia and signs such as neck stiffness and
change in sensorium. Checklists of red flags may be utilized by the novice to
safeguard against missing serious problems.
A simple heuristic that helps to narrow the differential diagnosis is trying to
categorize the disease as secondary to one organ/system involvement or multi-
systemic. A patient with fever and primarily respiratory-associated symptomatology
points to a respiratory system pathology while the presence of symptoms related to
several organ systems point to a multi-system disease.
Constructing a differential diagnosis
An important and well-recognized cause of diagnostic errors is failing to consider
alternative diagnoses [3, 5]. This is inherent to fully relying on heuristics for reaching
a clinical diagnosis [16, 17]. Heuristics as such are obviously error-prone. Trainees
must be equipped with simple concept maps or cognitive aids to seamlessly construct
a list of possible differential diagnoses [7]. These ‘schemes’ guide the trainee in
constructing a hypothesis-driven [19, 20], focused, rational, history taking,
examination and investigation plan. Three cognitive aids are depicted in Table 2.
The differential diagnosis of pain and swellings is generally anatomical.
Physiological differential diagnosis listing is especially applicable to two medical
problems, namely shock and thrombosis. All differential diagnosis listings may,
however, be easily structured along the two pathological or aetiopathological entities
of: congenital/hereditary or acquired. The latter may be sub-classified into 10
categories: traumatic, infective, inflammatory/autoimmune, vascular/degenerative,
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neoplastic/para-neoplastic, metabolic/endocrine, drug-induced/poisoning, deficiency
diseases, psychogenic and idiopathic/cryptogenic.
Rationally ordering a test or tests based on a practical ‘fast-and-frugal’
probability scoring
One major difficulty trainees’ exhibit after a patient encounter is coming-up with a
clinical probability for the possible diagnosis or differential diagnoses. Probability
estimation (based on the presence of risk factors and clinical findings) is crucial for
appropriate and rational diagnostic test ordering. An appropriate and practical
probability calculation or assessment methodology is the use of specific clinical
scoring or decision support tools such as the Well’s criteria for assessing the
probability of pulmonary thromboembolism. However, a more generic tool based on
the presence of a strong risk factor(s) for the problem or diagnosis and clinical
absence of alternative possibilities may be used for probability assessment. Thus the
presence of strong risk factor(s) for the problem or diagnosis coupled with the
absence of other significant competing differential diagnosis-supporting findings
qualifies the presumed diagnosis as high probability. On the other hand, if only one of
the two statements is true, the diagnostic probability is intermediate and if both are
negative, the probability is considered low. This ‘frugal heuristic’ [21, 22] which is
defined as the ability to reach a good probability assessment with limited
information, is thus fast and easily applicable. For example, a breast lump in a
30-year-old is unlikely to be cancerous. However, the presence of strong risk factor
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such as a family history or hormone replacement therapy use and clinical absence of
symptoms and signs of infection or history of trauma, breast feeding etc., makes
cancer a high probability.
Tests are then ordered based on their sensitivity and specificity for the possible
diagnosis [23, 24]. A composite of a test’s sensitivity and specificity is the
likelihood ratio. Definitions of sensitivity, specificity and likelihood ratios are
shown in Table 3. The rules for appropriate ordering are based on the clinician’s
probability assessment. Tests with high specificity (usually more expensive) are
appropriate for high and intermediate-probability assessments, especially when the
considered diagnosis is life-threatening such as spiral computerized tomographic
pulmonary angiography for a high probability embolism. On the other hand,
highly sensitive tests (usually less expensive) are appropriate for low probability
patients and for screening such as d-dimer testing for patients with low probability
for pulmonary embolism, Tuberculin test, or faecal occult blood testing. The
mnemonics for these are SpIn: highly specific tests are useful for ruling-in the
diagnosis when positive and SnOut: highly sensitive tests are useful for ruling-out
the diagnosis when negative. As such, highly specific tests are useful when
positive and highly sensitive tests are negative. It is worth noting, however, that
highly sensitive tests may also help in prognostication and assessing response to
treatment when they are indeed positive. Brain natriuretic peptide is a highly
sensitive test. When negative, it almost completely rules out left ventricular failure
as a cause of pulmonary oedema [25]. However, the higher the reading, the worse
the prognosis [25]. Reduction of levels to normal confirms improvement with
treatment [25].
A comprehensive knowledge of the sensitivity, specificity and likelihood ratios of
commonly used tests is therefore essential.
Appropriate diagnostic labelling: the BESD diagnosis cognitive aid
The bedside clinical diagnosis, a etiological cause and severity score diagnostic
labelling (BESD) concept map for comprehensive diagnostic labelling has been
described previously [26]. Trainees should be able to comprehensively provide a full
label that explicitly portrays the three essential domains of diagnosis: bedside clinical
diagnosis, aetiology or precipitant, and severity. Guidelines unambiguously
recommend severity scoring for many clinical conditions, for example for
community-acquired pneumonia, bronchial asthma, acute pancreatitis and stroke.
Commonly, trainees have a tendency to incompletely provide a diagnostic label for
their patients. For example, labelling a patient with community-acquired pneumonia
as such without paying attention to the possible aetiology, e.g. influenza A or
bacterial pneumonia or severity e.g. the CURB-65 score, may inevitably result in
lower quality and deficient care and poorer outcomes.
The practical use of the four phases above in diagnosing a patient may be
conducive to a reduction in diagnostic errors, improved and rational use of diagnostic
tests and better guideline implementation.
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Step 3: immediate therapeutic interventions: the 5S cognitive aid
Similar to the BESD model, the 5S concept map has also been described
previously [26]. The 5S therapeutic concept map (site of care, symptomatic
treatment, supportive care, specific care, speciality referral) is considered a simple
cognitive aid that will assist the practising physician (especially front-line staff in
the emergency room) in constructing an evidence-based, patient-centred, timely
and comprehensive therapeutic plan. Guidelines unambiguously dictate sites of
care for specific disease severity scores or categories, e.g. in a patient with diabetic
ketoacidosis and significant hypokalaemia or hyperosmolarity. Prompt provision of
symptomatic treatment is important as it directly alleviates patient discomfort.
Symptom relief is regrettably not regularly ordered by medical staff. An excellent
example is the poor use of analgesics in the acute care setting, referred to as
oligoanalgesia. Similarly, prompt use of supportive care to improve physiological
derangements before damage becomes irreversible and until the precipitant is
brought under control by its specific intervention may be life-saving, e.g. oxygen
therapy in hypoxic patients, intravenous fluids in patients with hypovolaemic
shock, or sodium bicarbonate in severely acidotic patients. Correctly providing
specific care to treat the primary cause or aetiology is a fundamental step in patient
care. Guidelines recommend early speciality or sub-speciality referral for specific
acute illnesses, e.g. patients with acute coronary syndromes or significant upper
gastrointestinal haemorrhage and associated co-morbidities need to be referred
early to their respective specialities.
Table 3 Sensitivity, specificity and likelihood ratios: definitions and examples
Sensitivity Example in a group of 100 patients with bacterial
pneumonia, 80 had a raised C-reactive protein
CRP: the sensitivity of CRP for diagnosing
bacterial pneumonia is thus 80 %
How often is the test result correct for persons in
whom the disease is known to be present?
Sensitivity—the proportion of people with disease
who have a positive test
Specificity Example in a group of 100 patients without
pneumonia, 10 had a raised C-reactive protein
CRP: the specificity of CRP for correctly
excluding pneumonia is thus 90 %
How often is the test result correct for persons in
whom the disease is known to be absent?
Specificity—the proportion of people without the
disease who have a negative test
Likelihood ratio Example A raised jugular venous pressure (JVP) in
a patient with a history suggestive of congestive
heart failure (CHF) has a positive likelihood ratio
of 5.8 and a negative ratio of 0.66. Thus the
presence of a raised JVP rules-in the diagnosis of
CHF. Its absence is not as useful in ruling it out
The likelihood that a given test result would be
expected in a patient with the target disorder
compared with the likelihood that the same result
would be expected in a patient without that
disorder.
In general, a positive likelihood ratio of 4 or more is
useful in ruling-in the target disorder. A negative
likelihood ratio of\0.3 is useful in ruling-out the
target disorder
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Step 4: the ACT cognitive aid: assessment of response to treatment, criteria
for discharge and timing of follow-up
It is critical and imperative that once a diagnosis is reached and a therapeutic
intervention is instigated, at least three other practical actions are undertaken. Firstly,
the assessment of response to treatment: a satisfactory response to one’s therapeutic
intervention is a solid proof that the diagnosis was correct and appropriate. Usually,
assessment of response is based on both subjective and objective measures. The latter
include either clinical criteria such as fever, vital signs etc. or laboratory and imaging
and other investigations. Failing to internalize clear and solid criteria for home
discharge or other patient disposition areas results in unnecessary and longer hospital
stays. The majority of patients who are discharged from hospital will require follow-
up visits. These are required for both disease and drug monitoring. Appropriateness
and timeliness of such visits may assist in reducing the readmission rates.
Table 4 A case scenario illustrating the use of the ‘technical’ expert summary, BESD, pathological
differential diagnosis and 5S therapeutic interventions
• 67-year-old male
• Bird/pigeon breeder, smoker
• 3-day history of fever, cough with yellow sputum, left stabbing chest pain that is worse with breathing
and coughing and breathlessness
• Clinically, breathless, cyanosed, disoriented to time, person and place,
Temperature 39.1 C
• BP 86/50 mmHg, RR 32/min, bilateral coarse crepitations, bronchial breathing left lower zone
• Chest X-ray: left basal consolidation
Summary
67-year-old, smoker and bird-breeder presenting with a 3-day history of productive cough, dyspnoea and
left pleuritic chest pains
Clinically confused, cyanosed, febrile, tachypnoiec and hypotensive with signs of left lower zone
consolidation
1. Bedside-clinical diagnosis Community acquired pneumonia with septic shock
2. Cause/precipitant Chlamydia psittaci
Aetio-pathological differential diagnosis
Other Infections: e.g. avian flu, cryptococcal infection
Inflammatory e.g. collagenosis, allergic alveolitis
Vascular e.g. pulmonary embolism
Neoplastic, drug-induced etc.
3. Severity Life-threatening (CURB-65 = 4)
4. Site of care ICU
5. Symptomatic Analgesia, anti-pyretic
6. Supportive Oxygen, intravenous fluids
7. Specific Antibiotics
8. Speciality referral Intensive therapy unit, pulmonary service
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Fig. 1 Diagnosis and therapy cognitive maps
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Final remarks
Apart from individual or trainee-directed cognitive interventions, system-based
interventions for reducing diagnostic and therapeutic errors and deficiencies must
similarly be put in place. Such system tools include curricula for regular training and
assessment of staff in decision-making skills and bias recognition, use of reminders
such as clinical pathways, protocols, order sets, checklists, use of computerized
decision support tools, mechanisms for error detection and rectification and a general
improvement in knowledge access by all staff [12, 13, 27, 28].
Table 4 portrays a case scenario illustrating the use of the expert summary, BESD,
pathological differential diagnosis and 5S therapeutic interventions schemes.
Figure 1 is a graphic summary of approaching a diagnostic challenge and the
immediate therapeutic interventions and further care inputs.
Essentials
1. Cognitive conceptual deficiencies in decision-making are recognized as an
important cause of poor patient care.
2. Unlike novices, experts develop robust and complex schemes that facilitate the
provision of higher-quality and time-efficient care inputs.
3. Empowering trainees with explicit, generic schemes of care early in their clinical
career may hasten their novice to expert critical thinking, problem-solving and
decision-making skills acquisition as well as improve their use of evidence-
based medicine.
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